Congress, the Constitution, and the Politics of Taxation by Strahan, Randall W.
Journal of Political Science 
Volume 15 Number 1 Article 4 
November 1987 
Congress, the Constitution, and the Politics of Taxation 
Randall W. Strahan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops 
 Part of the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Strahan, Randall W. (1987) "Congress, the Constitution, and the Politics of Taxation," Journal of Political 
Science: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.coastal.edu/jops/vol15/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Politics at CCU Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Political Science by an authorized editor of CCU Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact commons@coastal.edu. 
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE POLITICS OF 
TAXATION 
Randall Strahan 
When considering the question of how the Constitution governs American 
politics, there are two basic approaches one might take .* The first would be 
to consider the Constitution as a statement of the commitments and goals of 
the American republic and examine the extent to which the goals embodied in 
the document are realized in American political life. A second approach would 
be to view the Constitution as a set of institutional forms that govern the day-
to-day practice of American politics. This essay takes the second approach, 
looking at the changing role of constitutional forms in an important area of 
domestic policymaking. 
Article One, Section Seven of the United States Constitution contains 
what has been termed the originating clause : "All bills for raising revenue shall 
originate in the House of Representatives. " The Senate, according to the same 
provision, "may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills," but it 
may not vote new revenue legislation before action is taken in the House. 
Although the power to amend revenue bills has often made the Senate an equal 
participant in determining the final content of tax measures, the sequence of 
action specified in the Constitution has long been an important factor influencing 
the politics of taxation in Congress. During the 1980's, however, the consti-
tutionally-mandated sequence for approving tax legislation has been all but 
ignored on a number of occasions, with the result that previously established 
institutional roles for the House and Senate have become increasingly blurred. 
This historical pattern makes taxation an interesting case in which to consider 
how institutional forms defined by the Constitution influence American politics. 
The most dramatic recent example of congressional action inconsistent 
with the originating clause occurred in 1982, when the Senate took the lead 
in assembling and passing deficit reduction legislation that included a $98 billion 
tax increase. Some have argued that the initiative exercised by the Senate in 
1982 represents a "dangerous violation" of the restraints and balances built 
into the American constitutional system by the Founders.• The bicentennial of 
the Constitutional Convention seems, therefore, an especially appropriate time 
for reexamining the place of the Constitution in the politics of taxation. More-
over, the large federal deficits of recent years and the debate about and en-
actment of tax reform have focused attention on the adequacy of the institutions 
and processes involved in determining national budget and tax policy. 1n light 
of these concerns, the purpose of this article is to consider how the Constitution 
governs the politics of federal taxation. Since the Constitution assigns final 
responsibility for setting tax policy to Congress , the focus of the article is on 
politics in the legislative branch. 
The analysis offered here is based on the premise that whether one is 
concerned with the politics of taxation, or with explaining patterns of congres-
sional decisionmaking in other policy areas, three basic types of variables must 
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be taken into account: 1) institutional factors (including but not limited to 
constitutionally-mandated structures and procedures); 2) the policy context 
associated with a specific issue or policy area; and 3) leadership by those in 
key institutional positions. The article will show how changes in these factors 
converged in the early 1980's to undercut the traditional importance of the 
constitutional originating clause as a factor governing tax decisionmaking. In 
the concluding section, the article will examine the consequences of these 
changes and the longer term prospects for the influence of the Constitution in 
the tax policy process . 
TAX POLITICS IN THE POSTWAR CONGRESS 
During the 1950's and 1960's, careful observers of congressional poli-
tics found a consistent pattern in the politics of major tax legislation. This 
pattern was attributable in part to the influence of the originating clause of 
the Constitution. "The right of the House to originate revenue legislation," 
John F. Manley pointed out in his 1970 book, The Politics of Finance, "can 
be and has been important as a strategic factor in House-Senate delibera-
tions." 2 Specifically, Manley explained, there was a "standing decision" on 
the part of the Senate "to await House action in all but the most usual 
cases, i.e., situations in which House action is problematical and Senate 
pressure, or pressure on the Senate, is irresistible." 3 
Along with certain institutional differences between the House and Sen-
ate, adherence to the sequence of decision required by the originating 
clause produced a certain degree of regularity in tax policymaking across the 
two chambers. In the House, tax decisionmaking was insulated from particu-
lar groups and interests seeking favorable tax treatment by institutional ar-
rangements which effectively delegated control over tax decisions to the 
Ways and Means Committee. This committee, staffed primarily with senior 
members from electorally-secure districts, drafted tax bills in closed-door 
sessions, then submitted them to the House for approval under a special 
procedure (the "closed rule") which prohibited amendments by non-commit-
tee members . 
The members of the postwar Ways and Means Committee normally ex-
ercised their power cautiously, seeking to build a broad consensus behind 
the bills they reported to the House. Close observers of the committee 
noted among its members a sense of responsibility for guarding the revenue 
prerogatives of the House and a concern for protecting the fiscal integrity of 
the federal government. As Manley commented after conducting an exten-
sive series of interviews with members of the panel: " .. the job of Ways 
and Means, as the members see it, is to balance the fiscal realities with the 
plethora of demands for tax reductions or special provisions." 4 As evidence 
that the committee usually struck a successful balance between maintaining 
fiscal objectives on the one hand and responding to particular demands for 
favorable tax treatment on the other, during the postwar years tax bills re-
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ported by Ways and Means almost always won majority support when sub-
mitted to the House for approval. 5 
Tax politics in the postwar Senate looked much different. First, the rel-
atively closed nature of the tax decisionmaking process in the House tended 
to focus lobbying activity on the Senate. Thus, the limited opportunities to 
influence tax legislation in its early stages in the House often made the Sen-
ate the primary forum for the myriad clientele and constituency groups 
seeking to bring about or prevent changes in the tax code. A second differ-
ence between the two chambers was that the Senate Finance Committee, 
and the decisionmaking process in the Senate generally, were more oriented 
toward responding to these particular groups and interests than their House 
counterparts. 
Richard F. Fenno, Jr. offered the following description of the Senate 
tax committee in his comparative study of congressional committees pub-
lished in 1973: 
Finance members can help themselves by helping 
clientele groups. They are encouraged in this stance by 
the conditioning force of the legislative sequence in which 
they always act after the House has passed its bill and in 
which they always are beseiged by groups appealing House 
decisions. [Finance] Committee members have standard-
ized their decision context by assuming that the House has 
given general form to the bill and that their task is to deal, 
by amendment, with the remaining "hot spots" in that bill. 
Their decision strategy, then, is to give remedial assist-
ance to clientele groups who appeal to them for redress 
from House decisions. 6 
To be sure, some tax legislation during the postwar years did not fit this 
pattern. But in most cases, the House initiated action on tax bills in Congress 
and set the basic outlines for major policy changes. The Senate then revised 
the legislation, often responding to clientele and constituency group appeals. 
Policy outcomes in the House tend more toward maintaining federal revenues; 
those in the Senate tended to bear a greater imprint of particular interests 
seeking reduces tax burdens. 7 As Manley and Fenno documented, these pat-
terns were in part traceable to an established sequence of decision-making 
arising from constitutional requirements for passing tax legislation. In this 
respect, the Constitution governed tax politics in the postwar Congress. 
TAX POLITICS IN THE "NEW CONGRESS" 
Just as the studies of the postwar Congress discussed above began to 
appear in the early 1970's, Congress was embarking on a major period of 
reform. Many of the structural and procedural arrangements which influ-
enced the politics of the postwar institution were dismantled or recast. By 
the end of the decade some observers of legislative politics were even 
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speaking of a "new Congress" due to the impact of reforms and other 
changes on established patterns in congressional politics. 8 Of particular im-
portance for understanding changes in tax politics were two sets of institu-
tional reforms enacted during this period: 1) reforms in the House affecting 
the Ways and Means Committee; and 2) the creation of a new budget pro-
cess. 
As has been shown in a series of essays by the political scientist Cath-
erine Rudder, the Ways and Means Committee was a major target of house 
reformers during the 1970's.9 The Ways and Means reforms occurred partly 
because the tax committee's closely-held power clashed with the new parti-
cipatory politics of the period, and partly because the political balance in the 
House has shifted in favor of liberal Democrats who had long been frus-
trated by the committee's caution in initiating new social and economic pro-
grams. According to Rudder, the following reforms brought about significant 
changes in the politics of tax issues : 
l. secret ballot selection of committee chairmen instead of complete 
reliance on the seniority system; 
2. modification of the closed rule under which Ways and Means bills could 
be considered on the House floor without amendment; 
3. open committee proceedings, including House-Senate conferences, 
except when a majority of the committee agrees by a roll call vote to close 
a meeting; 
4. enlargement of the Ways and Means Committee by one-third; 
5. transfer of House Democratic committee assignments from Ways and 
Means to the Steering and Policy Committee; and 
6. creation of Ways and Means subcommittees . 10 
These reforms altered the tax decisionmaking process in the House in a 
number of important ways. First, the expansion in the size of the Ways and 
Means Committee and the change to open committee and conference sessions 
increased the opportunities for participation in tax decisions. By the same 
token, these reforms substantially reduced the institutional "counterweights" 
which had traditionally limited the responsiveness of House tax decision.makers 
to demands from clientele and constituency interests for more favorable tax 
treatment. The other changes adopted by the House during the 1970's - a 
new selection process for committee chairmen, a revision in the closed rule 
to allow floor votes on amendments approved by the Democratic Caucus, and 
transfer of the committee assignment power from Ways and Means to the 
Democratic Steering and Policy Committee - created new opportunities for 
the exercise of influence over committee decisions by the majority party and 
its leadership in the House. 
The new budget process set up by the Budget and Impoundment Control 
Act of 197 4 also created new channels for influencing tax policy decisions in 
Congress. Although no real consensus existed at the time regarding the policy 
objectives to be pursued through a more centralized budget process, the ap-
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parent breakdown of an informal, decentralized process for making revenue-
decisions, and challenges to congressional spending authority from the Nixon 
Administration, led to the passage of the Budget Act. The budget reforms 
established a new set of organizational units (the House and Senate Budget 
Committees and the Congressional Budget Office) and a new procedure (the 
budget resolution) for coordinating tax and spending decisions. Most observers 
agree that the budget process had a relatively limited impact on tax and spending 
decisions during the 1970's. 11 But the existence of the new process create d 
the institutional underpinnings for major changes in congressional politics during 
the following decade. 
How, then, have tax issues been decided in the "new" Congress? In some 
respects, congressional tax politics changed dramatically in the aftermath of 
the 1970's reforms. As Rudder has shown, the formulation of tax legislation 
in the House is no longer dominated by a consensus-oriented Ways and Means 
Committee as had been the case during the postwar years. In 1974 and 1975, 
for example, the House Democratic caucus intervened in the development of 
tax bills, and throughout the late 1970's amendment or even defeat of tax 
legislation reported by the Ways and Means Committee became common-
place. 12 Even with these important changes in the House, however, the Con-
stitution continued to govern the sequence of tax decisionmaking during the 
1970's. In each of the seven major tax bills enacted between 1971 and 1980, 
review by the Ways and Means Committee and House passage preceded the 
reporting of a bill by the Finance Committee and final action by the Senate 
(see Table 1). 
Table 1 
CO GRESSIONAL ACTIO ON ~WOR TAX LEGISLATION DURI G THE 1970'5 
House Senate 
Bill Reported• Passed Reported•• Passed 
Revenue Act of 9129'71 IOI 6171 ll / 9nt 11/22/71 
1971 
Tax Reducuon Act 21I9n5 2/27n5 '31l7n5 3m/75 
of 1975 
Tax Refonn Act 11/12/75 12 4/75 5/27n6 81 6176 
of 1976 
Tax Reduction Act 21I1m 'JI 8177 'J/2ln7 4/29n7 
of 1977 
EnerJ!Y Tax Act 6f:INl7 5/77 I0/2ln7 I0/31n7 
of 1978 
Revenue Act of 8/ 4178 8/10/78 10/ ins 10/10/78 
1978 
Wmdfall Profit Tax 6122179 6/28179 Il l ln9 I21I7n9 
of 1980 
Source: Schick, Congress and Money , pp. 546-547, Congressional Quarterly Almanaca . 
•Date on wluch the House Ways and Mean Committee voted to report the bill to the House. 










During the early 1980's, however, a clear break appears in this pattern 
as new political forces worked to eclipse constitutionally-mandated procedures 
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in shaping decisionmaking on tax issues. The first indication of a shift away 
from the institutional roles mandated by the Constitution came in 1980. That 
year Congress had strengthened the reconciliation procedure of the budget 
process, thus creating and effective mechanism for ensuring that standing 
committees in each house would report legislation needed to achieve budgetary 
goals. When the new procedure was first invoked, the Senate initiated a budget 
reconciliation bill in July of 1980 that raised $3.6 billion in new federal revenues 
during fiscal year 1981. The House did not approve its version of the recon-
ciliation measure until early September. Thus, under the new reconciliation 
procedure a modest revenue increase was originated by the Senate. 13 
Tax politics in Congress during 1981 and 1982 continued to depart from 
traditional patterns. In February of 1981, President Ronald Reagan submitted 
to Congress a proposal to cut personal and business taxes by $718 billion over 
fiscal years 1981 through 1986. Although most in Congress supported some 
form of tax reduction, support for the Reagan proposal was mixed. In particular, 
many Democrats argued that the cuts were too large and weighted unfairly in 
favor of upper-income taxpayers. 
After the House Ways and Means Committee completed hearings on the 
Reagan proposal, informal talks between House and Senate leaders on com-
promise proposals began in May. When the talks broke off without results in 
early June, the Republican-controlled Senate Finance Committee broke with 
the tradition of awaiting House action and went directly to the task of drafting 
new legislation based on the Reagan proposal. Senate floor debate on the 
Finance Committee bill had already begun when the Ways and Means Com-
mittee reported its version of the tax bill to the House on July 23. Also before 
the House at this point was an Administration bill that had been assembled by 
Republicans and conservative Democrats. 
On July 29 the House rejected the Ways and Means Committee bill, passing 
instead the substitute proposal supported by the Administration. The same 
day, the Senate voted approval of its tax reduction package. In deference to 
the originating clause, the Senate returned its version of the bill to the Senate 
Calendar, then substituted its own language for that of the House bill before 
voting final passage on July 31. The formal requirements of the constitutional 
provision were satisfied, but there was no doubt that the Senate had moved 
well beyond the reactive role it normally played in tax politics during the postwar 
years. 
In 1982 the Senate made an even more dramatic break with its traditional 
role by initiating a major tax increase that clearly encroached on the consti-
tutional prerogatives of the House. With the passage of major tax cuts in 1981 
and the onset of a serious recession, deficit projections quickly began to reach 
what many considered alarming levels. In response to Administration budget 
proposals that were seen as politically unrealistic, House and Senate leaders 
met informally with White House officials early in 1982 (the so-called "Gang 
of 17") to try to negotiate a compromise plan which would result in lower 
deficit figures . 
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When no agreement could be reached by late April, Democratic leaders 
in the House decided to leave to the Republican Senate the political risks 
associated with initiating the tax increases and spending cuts needed to reduce 
the deficit. 14 Senate Republican leaders continued to negotiate with the White 
House, and were able to reach agreement on a compromise budget. The Senate 
then passed a budget resolution based on the compromise agreement on May 
21. The Senate resolution called for $95 billion in new revenues over fiscal 
years 1983 through 1985. After voting down eight alternative versions, the 
House followed suit with adoption of a similar resolution on June 12. Once the 
final form of the resolution was agreed to by both Houses , the two tax com-
mittees were faced with the responsibility for drafting actual legislation to raise 
the new revenues. 
The Constitution and tradition notwithstanding, many House Democrats 
seemed more than happy to allow the Republican-controlled Senate to write 
the election year tax increase. As a result, the House found itself in a reactive 
position - i.e., facing the need to act on a major tax bill drafted by the Senate. 
Chairman Robert Dole (R-Kansas) of the Finance Committee moved quickly 
to develop a bill to raise the new revenues. On July 2 the Senate committee 
approved a $98 billion tax increase in the form of an amendment to a minor 
tax bill that had previously passed the House. The Finance Committee bill was 
approved by the Senate on July 23 by a vote of 50 to 47. 
Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-lllinois) of the House Ways and Means 
Committee called a caucus of committee Democrats on July 21 to discuss a 
tentative framework for a House bill, but a majority of Democrats preferred 
instead to allow the Senate bill to set the terms of the tax increase. After the 
Senate had completed action on the tax measure, the Ways and Means Com-
mittee voted on July 28 to go to conference with the Senate on the minor bill 
to which the tax increase had been attached. Later the same day the full House 
voted to accept the committee 's recommendation. Although Ways and Means 
members exercised some influence over the final form of the legislation during 
conference negotiations, the politics of the 1982 tax bill reduced the consti-
tutional originating clause to little more than a bare formality. 15 
The House has, however, reasserted its originating function in major tax 
legislation adopted since 1982, raising the question of whether the cases in 
the early 1980's were temporary aberrations caused by extraordinary circum-
stances. In 1984, the Ways and Means Committee took the lead in assembling 
a deficit reduction package that included $49 billion in a new tax revenues over 
fiscal years 1984-1987. The committee completed work on the bill on March 
1, 1984, and the full House approved the measure on April 11. The Finance 
Committee reported its version of the bill on March 21, followed by Senate 
passage on April 13. By taking the initiative in the development of the basic 
outlines for the revenue package in 1984, the House had clearly moved back 
toward its traditional role in the tax area. 
The sequence of action in Congress on the major tax reform proposal 
introduced by the Reagan Administration in 1985 also represented a return in 
some respects to more traditional patterns in tax politics. The Ways and Means 
Committee drafted a tax reform package in the fall of 1985, which (after an 
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initial procedural defeat) passed the House of Representatives on December 
17. The Senate Finance Committee then began work on a bill in the spring of 
the following year, reporting its version on May 7, 1986. Passage of the Finance 
Committee bill by the Senate on June 24 paved the way for the most sweeping 
overhaul of the tax code in decades. The 1986 tax reform act appeared to 
confirm the reemergence of the constitutional originating clause as a major 
factor shaping tax politics in Congress. Other signs, though, suggest caution 
in drawing the conclusion that the sequence of action required by the originating 
clause has again become a given in congressional tax politics. The key to 
understanding the role of the Constitution in this area is to take a broader look 
at the range of important factors affecting this area of congressional politics. 
FACTORS GOVERNING CONGRESSIONAL TAX POLITICS 
In September of 1986, just as the historic tax reform legislation was ap-
proaching final passage in Congress, House Ways and Means Committee 
members balked at a proposal by Chairman Dan Rostenkowski to raise ex-
cise taxes by $6.4 billion in order to reduce the budget deficit. According to 
the Wall Street Journal, staffers indicated that the sentiment among Ways 
and Means Democrats was that "the committee would wait for the Senate 
to act first to increase taxes. "16 This most recent example helps to illustrate 
that the Constitution's originating clause continues to be only one of a num-
ber of shifting factors affecting congressional decisionmaking in the tax area 
today. An overview of developments related to three basic sets of factors 
will help to explain the uncertain status of the Constitution in contemporary 
tax politics. 
Institutional Change 
Institutional arrangements are the first major factor influencing decision-
making patterns in Congress. Structures, rules and established practices serve 
to channel the behavior of those who become involved in the legislative process. 
The basic institutional framework for congressional politics is set forth in the 
United States Constitution - including the requirement that tax bills must 
originate in the House. There have not been any major changes in the basic 
constitutional framework for congressional politics over the period considered 
in this article but there have been other institutional changes, some of which 
have created tensions or even direct conflicts with constitutional requirements 
in the tax area. 
The importance of the congressional reforms of the 1970's for the politics 
of taxation has already been noted. From an institutional perspective, some of 
the 1970's reforms substantially undermined the ability of the House to exercise 
the originating function. First, reforms in the House designed to broaden 
participation and increase the influence of the majority party also had the effect 
of weakening the Ways and Means Committee. After the reforms, the larger, 
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more open committee often experienced great difficulty in developing tax leg-
islation which could attract the support of a majority in the House. The reforms 
resulted in a more volatile, fractious decisionrnaking process in the House 
which all but invited the Senate to adopt a more assertive role regarding those 
tax issues on which its members could reach a consensus . 
Congress instituted new budget procedures during the 1970's which also 
created the potential for conflicts with the originating clause. Under the budget 
process, each house is responsible for formulating an overall plan for tax and 
spending decisions, and each has a budget committee to manage the job. The 
traditional sequence of House-Senate action in tax and appropriations measures 
has not carried over into budget-making; "each budget committee puts together 
its budget resolution de nova with respect to the other chamber." 17 The 
reconciliation procedure makes it possible for the Senate to initiate either 
spending or revenue measures through the budget process. As Allen Schick 
has commented , "the Senate is no longer in a reactive role vis-a-vis the 
House. " 18 When conditions make skirting the originating clause appear ad-
vantageous to Congress, the budget process provides a effective mechanism 
for doing so. 
Policy Context 
If institutional changes in the 1970's created the possibility for a more 
active Senate role in revenue decisions, shifts in budget and tax issues in the 
early 1980's were the impetus for such new patterns of decisionrnaking. In 
this sense, changes in the policy context have also been important in deter-
mining the extent to which the Constitution governs tax politics. Two changes 
in the policy context associated with tax issues have been most important: (1) 
the emergence of large budget deficits, and (2) the partisan dynamics which 
have surrounded budget and tax issues in the 1980's. 
Large deficits have focused the attention of Congress on the overall budget 
picture, making the budget process much more important for congressional 
politics than it was before. The budget process provides the primary institu-
tional setting within which deficit reduction measures involving both spending 
and revenues can be negotiated and implemented. As was noted above, the 
revenue originating function of the House is not recognized in the organization 
of the budget process. Either house may originate action under the process. 
Therefore, as long as large deficits continue to encourage the initiation of 
revenue legislation through the budget process, the influence of the Consti-
tution over tax politics will be uncertain. 
The second important policy-related factor has been change in the partisan 
dynamics of tax issues. The political configuration which resulted from the 1980 
election, i.e. Democratic control of the House, with Republican control of the 
White House and the Senate, encouraged a more active role for the Senate in 
the early 1980's. In 1981, Senate Republicans were unified in support of the 
President's tax proposal, and were unwilling to wait for the Democratic House 
before beginning work on tax reduction legislation. In 1982, the partisan dy-
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namics of tax policy also encouraged a more active Senate role as House 
Democrats were reluctant to initiate a major tax increase to offset deficits 
resulting from the Administration's economic program. Under these conditions 
the desire to let the other party take the political heat became a major factor 
in tax decisionmaking. The existence of divided partisan control in Congress 
during the 1980's, then, has also created tensions with the constitutionally-
required procedures for enacting tax legislation. 
Leadership 
Within the constraints defined by institutional and policy-related factors, 
the behavior of congressional leaders may also have an important effect on 
how decisions are made in Congress. Tax decisionmaking is no exception. In 
each case where conditions created the possibility for a more assertive role 
for the Senate, individual leaders took the initiative in building coalitions behind 
Senate bills. Senator Pete Domenici (R-New Mexico), Chairman of the Senate 
Budget Committee, and Senator Robert Dole (R-Kansas), Chairman of the 
Senate Finance Committee, exercised skillful leadership in engineering budget 
and tax initiatives in the early 1980's. 
The new tax and budget politics of the 1980's, in conjunction with the 
institutional changes of the previous decade, created the conditions for a major 
shift in the established institutional roles of the House and Senate. When Senate 
majorities decided to take the initiative in enacting new revenue legislation in 
1980 and 1982, the assignment of the originating power to the House by the 
Constitution was overshadowed by other factors. Therefore, the question, 
"Does the Constitution Govern?" cannot be answered with a simple yes or no 
in this important area of national politics. All other things being equal, Congress 
continues to follow constitutional procedures in enacting tax legislation. But 
legislators have shown an increasing willingness in recent years to violate this 
provision if fiscal conditions or political expediency make a more active Senate 
role appear desireable. Looking toward the beginning of the third century under 
the Constitution, an appropriate conclusion for this article is a reconsideration 
of the importance of the originating clause in federal tax politics. 
CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND TAX POLITICS: 
INTO THE THIRD CENTURY 
During the 1980's, we have witnessed a major shift in the respective 
roles of the House and Senate in policymaking for taxation. No longer does 
the constitutional originating clause insure that the House will act first in en-
acting new policy decisions, and no longer is the Senate content to act in a 
reactive fashion. A long as the factors which brought about this shift con-
tinue to be part of the national political scene - especially the structural-
procedural arrangements that emerged from the reforms of the 1970's and 
the large budget deficits that emerged in the 1980's - it is reasonable to 
expect continued volatility in the tax decisionmaking process. New proce-
dures such as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget law add to the 
uncertainty regarding institutional roles. 
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How, then, should we view the prospe ct for continued erosion of con-
stitutional procedures in the tax area? A look back to the founding period 
suggests that the framers ' rationale for the originating clause is somewhat 
less compelling today than in the early years of the Republic. Based on Eng-
lish practice, the power to originate legislation was placed in the more dem-
ocratic legislative chamber in order to keep this potentially dangerous power 
under close control of the citizenry. Many at the Constitutional Convention 
feared that the indirectly-elected Senate might abuse the power to raise 
revenues because of its independence from direct popular control. As El-
bridge Gerry commented:" .. by their appointments, the members [of the 
Senate] would be farther removed from the people, would have a greater 
and more independent property in their offices, would be more extrava-
gant.,, 19 
With the change to direct popular election in 1913, the Senate is no 
longer removed from control by popular majorities. Although one may still 
argue that the House provides a closer representation of American society 
than does the Senate, the original justification for assigning the originating 
function to the House is certainly less forceful today when senators as well 
as House members must stand for popular election. 
Over the years , however, the originating clause had become an estab-
lished part of American political practice, helping to bring stability in the dif-
ficult and potentially conflictual process of assigning tax burdens among the 
various interests in American society. An established sequence of tax deci-
sionmaking helped a broad range of participants (both inside and outside of 
Congress) orient their actions and make sense of the process. The House 
could be expected to look at the "big picture" on tax issues, while the Sen-
ate would be more amenable to making policy adjustments requested by 
specific interests. 
As conditions in the 1980's undermined adherence to the originating 
clause, the most troubling consequence of this trend has been the instability 
which has resulted in the process for developing federal tax policy. Some 
have argued that this recent volatility has made the tax decisionmaking proc-
ess much less effective than in the past, with careful deliberation through 
normal institutional channels often giving way to ad hoc procedures domi-
nated by short term concerns. 20 In spite of the changes in electoral proce-
dures which call into question the initial justification for the originating 
clause, adherence to this provision helps to maintain a degree of stability 
and predictability that is much needed in contemporary tax politics. In an era 
of fiscal stress tensions will continue to exist between constitutional require-
ments for adopting tax legislation and pressures encouraging new channels 
for policymaking. Under these conditions, Article One, Section Seven of the 
Constitution has become only one of a number of important factors govern-
ing tax decisionmaking in Congress. Although it is unlikely that the erosion 
of constitutional procedures in the tax area will lead to the problems feared 
by those who drafted the originating clause two centuries ago, the instability 
created by continued violations of the constitutional mandate may bode ill for 
the quality of our contemporary tax policy. 
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